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Abstract  
The facts on the ground suggest that the breakthrough was exactly that – a breakthrough.  While 
it signals what is possible and where the rest of the South is headed, assuming continued 
political organizing around day-to-day concerns, the current right wing hold on politics in the 
South remains a formidable reactionary force on city councils, within county commissions, 
among judiciary and in state bodies.  Despite Obama’s groundbreaking wins in Virginia, North 
Carolina and Florida, a closer look at his performance, especially among young white 
Southerners, suggests that the change many believe has already been achieved has, in fact, not 
yet arrived. Transformative strategies are necessary to secure and build on the 2008 
breakthrough.    
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The November 4, 2008 electoral victory by Barack Obama was one of the most stunning 
developments in United States history.  Besides being the first Black elected President of the 
United States, Obama’s landslide victory in the Electoral College1 reflected a remarkably well 
organized and disciplined campaign strategy that included the determination to win electoral 
votes in the South, an area of the country previously considered “safe” Republican Party territory 
by most political observers.      
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the “Southern Strategy” has been 
defeated, just as it would be enormously naïve to conclude that, because of Obama’s victory, 
                                                          
1 The final total was Obama’s 365 to McCain’s 173 electoral votes while the popular vote was much closer at 53%, 
or 66,882, 230 million votes for Obama to 46%, or 58, 343, 671 votes for McCain. 
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racism has been overcome.  We did not magically enter a “post-racial political period” on 
November 5, 2008.  
In fact our view is quite the opposite.  The facts on the ground suggest that the 
breakthrough was exactly that – a breakthrough.  While it signals what is possible and where the 
rest of the South is headed, assuming continued political organizing around day-to-day concerns, 
the current right-wing hold on politics in the South remains a formidable reactionary force on 
city councils, within county commissions, among the judiciary and in state legislative bodies.  
Despite Obama’s groundbreaking wins in Virginia, North Carolina and Florida, a closer look at 
his performance, especially among young white Southerners, suggests that the change many 
believe has already been achieved, has in fact, not yet arrived.  Transformative strategies are 
necessary to secure and build on the 2008 breakthrough. 
 
The Southern Strategy: The Republican Party’s Racial Appeal in the New South 
The long struggle for the right of political participation was a central theme of almost all 
the major Black human rights organizations founded in the early years of the 20th century.  Prior  
to the signing of the 1965 Voting Rights Act, the overwhelming majority of Blacks, Latinos and 
Native Americans either could not vote or faced state-sanctioned restrictions on their right to 
participate in the political process ranging from poll taxes to literacy tests – restrictions enforced 
by an extrajudicial reign of terror.   
From 1948 to 1984, the Southern states, traditionally a stronghold for Democrats, became 
key swing states, providing the popular vote margins in 1960, 1968, and 1976 elections.  But by 
1964 it had become clear that the segregationist Democratic Party could no longer contain the 
tensions within it.  Human rights leaders such as Fannie Lou Hamer, along with others in the 
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Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party, challenged the segregationist delegation at the 1964 
Atlantic City, New Jersey Democratic Convention.  The human rights struggles in Birmingham 
and Selma crystallized the resolve of Blacks to resist political domination by racist 
conservatives. 
During this era, several Republican candidates expressed support for states’ rights, 
signaling their opposition to the passage of legislation to protect the franchise and federal 
enforcement of civil rights for Blacks.  The Southern Strategy emerged as the crystallization of 
the “anti-civil rights movement” in electoral form.  It was led initially by Arizona Senator Barry 
Goldwater, who was able to win five Southern states in 1964 based largely on his opposition to 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act.  The 1964 Barry Goldwater Campaign was followed by the 
presidential campaign of the openly racist Alabama Governor George Wallace.  Running as an 
Independent, Wallace was able to carry seven Southern states in 1968.  His 1972 campaign was 
cut short when he was shot. 
Changes were clearly on the horizon, bought forth by the civil rights movement in the 
1960s.  A political backlash emerged, and, with Blacks demanding political representation, many 
southern Democrats looked for a new home outside the Democratic Party.  The switch in party 
identification by white Southerners was led by some of the most staunchly racist southern 
Democrats.  One of the first policymakers to join the Republican Party was the former Dixiecrat 
leader and 1948 presidential candidate, South Carolina Senator Strom Thurman, who switched in 
1964.   
The success of Goldwater and Wallace was not lost on Republican strategists.  In a 1970 
New York Times interview, Kevin Phillips concluded: 
From now on the Republicans are never going to get more than 10 to 20 percent of the 
Negro vote and they don’t need any more than that…but Republicans would be 
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shortsighted if they weakened enforcement of the Voting Rights Act.  The more Negros 
who register as Democrats in the South, the sooner the Negrophobe whites will quit the 
Democrats and become Republicans.  That’s where the votes are.  Without that prodding 
from blacks, the whites will backslide into their old comfortable arrangement with the 
local Democrats.2 
 
Richard Nixon took note of both the 1964 and 1968 developments, and by the 1972 
elections the “Southern Strategy” was being perfected.  Nixon’s coded language of “law and 
order” and “states’ rights” led to his winning in nine southern states.  The language used in the 
racial appeal to white Southerners may have been articulated in less virulent terms than those 
used by segregationists like George Wallace, but the message was clearly understood: The 
Republican Party is the party for white people. 
The Southern Strategy became the core of the Republican Party’s national organizing 
approach to presidential campaigns.  Their faith in that strategy was so firm that in 1980 Ronald 
Reagan launched his national campaign against Jimmy Carter from Philadelphia, Mississippi, the 
site of the notorious murders of civil rights workers James Chaney, Andrew Goodman and 
Michael Schwerner.  
The impact of the mass exodus of white Southerners from the Democratic Party was the 
routine delivery of the South to the Republican Party.  In fact, prior to the 2008 elections, 
Republicans won seven out of the previous ten presidential contests, largely with a reliable 
Southern-based vote.  The table below reflects part of that history.   




1980 18 127 
1984 0 153 
                                                          
2 See James Boyd, “Nixon’s Southern Strategy: It’s All in the Charts,” New York Times May 17, 1970, p. 21 
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1988 5 147 
1992 54 108 
1996 64 96 
2000 0 150 
2004 0 161 
2008 57 104 
Source: Center for Citizens Participation 
 
Democratic Party Dilemmas 
On the Democratic side, even some of the leading officials who were supportive of the 
goals of the civil rights movement knew that the 1965 Voting Rights Act would split the 
Democratic Party and cause havoc with respect to a national organizing strategy.  In fact, shortly 
after signing the Voting Rights Act into law, President Lyndon Johnson reportedly stated, 
“We’ve lost the South for a hundred years.” 
As the power of the Republican Party grew in the South and the “Regan Democrats” 
became a force nationwide, the Democratic Party struggled for a viable strategy.  Only in 
the1976, 1992 and 1996 elections, with Southern white men at the top of the ticket, were they 
able to gain the White House. 
In 2000 and 2004, the Party made a significant strategic decision to write off the South.  
The nominees and their top advisors believed they could win without winning anywhere in the 
South.  A number of strategists and academics wrote influential articles and books regarding the 
best way to “whistle past Dixie” on the way to the White House. 
The practical problem with this national organizing strategy was that there was no room 
for error.  With the South conceded, losing any one of the 18 designated battleground states 
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could mean losing the entire election.  The implementation of that strategy in both 2000 and 
2004 led to a concentration of resources and basically rendered several potentially competitive 
states non-competitive.   
Perhaps the most glaring error with the “whistling” strategy was that it ignored the most 
loyal voting bloc within the Democratic Party, i.e., Blacks.  Close to 60 percent of the country’s 
Black population is located in the South and Black voters have provided the Democratic Party 
with an average of 90 percent of their votes in all national elections since 1964.  In most of the 
Southern states, Blacks now constitute between 40 and 50 percent of the Democratic Party 
primary voters.  However, the national strategy of the Democrats, especially since the 1990s, was 
to run away from its more liberal base in an attempt to win back some of the Reagan Democrats.   
Additionally, a singular focus on the top of the ticket, i.e., winning the White House, 
meant that very competitive Senate and House seats were ignored time and again.  Since Harvey 
Gantt’s historic contests with the racist Senator Jesse Helms in North Carolina during the 1980s, 
the Democratic Party had shown little interest in state-wide elections in the Deep South when 
Blacks were the candidates.  Both times Gantt ran he came within a few hundred thousand votes 
of defeating Helms but did not receive the level of support from the national Democratic Party 
that he believed was needed to defeat the conservative icon.  As Gantt’s chances improved, 
Helms resorted to an openly racist communications strategy of airing misleading, racially 
charged anti-affirmative action television ads across the state.  
The lack of Democratic Party interest in Southern electoral contests seems odd given the 
evidence to support the idea of the party being able to offer robust challenges to Republican 
dominance in the region. Election results at the state and local levels and the possibility of 
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building strategic coalitions composed of core Democratic constituencies were dismissed or 
simply ignored. 
 
Obama Challenges the Southern Strategy 
That a Southern battleground existed at all during the 2008 elections was clear testament 
to the resource-rich Obama phenomenon and the campaign’s determination to challenge the 
Republicans all across the country including the South.  The campaign’s “50-state strategy,” 
supported by Howard Dean and the Democratic National Committee, was successful in 
challenging the Republicans in states previously won by Bush and a long roster of Republican 
candidates before him.  As the general election neared, the Southern Battleground that took 
shape included the possibility of wins in Virginia, North Carolina and Florida. 
By wining these states, Obama won 57 of the 270 electoral votes he needed to be elected 
president, or 21 percent.  More importantly, he was able to finally break the stranglehold the 
Republican Party had developed over the entire South over more than 30 years.  Chris Kromm of 
Southern Exposure magazine correctly observed: “Those who don’t believe that the South is 
important to national politics will dismiss the results, echoing outgoing Sen. John Warner’s 
claim in a recent interview that Florida, North Carolina and Virginia are ‘different’ from the rest 
of the South.  On the contrary, these states are symbols of the direction much of the South is 
headed, not just a region with more “outsiders” but a younger, more urban more richly diverse 
South overall.3  
It is important to appreciate the historic nature of Obama’s victory in the South.  
Nationally, he received more of the white vote than any presidential Democratic candidate since 
                                                          
3 Kromm, Chris, “A New South Rising,” Facing South, online magazine of the Institute for Southern Studies, 
November 23, 2008.  www.southernstudies.org/2008/11/a-new-south-rising.html 
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Lyndon Johnson in 1964.  And Obama won close to 20 million votes in the South.  But it would 
be an enormous mistake to equate the fact that three Southern states helped elect the first Black 
president with the defeat of the Southern Strategy. 
The truth of the matter is that even if McCain had won Virginia, North Carolina and 
Florida, he still would not have won the presidency in 2008.  He would have finished with a 
more respectable total of 230 electoral votes but little else.  In other words, Obama could have 
won the election without winning the South.   
More importantly, a rigorous assessment of the 2008 election provides evidence of how 
and to what extent the South is changing, while giving the lie to notions of a “post-racial” society 
or a radically transformed South. 
Below are the national results of Obama’s performance among several key demographic 
groups.   
                                         National Election Results 
Category Obama McCain 
Male 49% 48% 
Female 56% 43% 
18 – 29  66% 32% 
30 – 44  52% 46% 
45 – 64  50% 49% 
65 and above 45% 53% 
2004 0 161 
2008 57 104 
                            Source: CNN 2008 General Election Exit Polls  
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Nationwide, Obama won the women’s vote 56 percent to McCain’s 43 percent.  
However, in the South he lost the white women’s vote to McCain 21 percent to 78 percent.  For 
example, in Georgia white women voted for McCain/Palin 74 percent to 26 percent for 
Obama/Biden, while Black women voted 97 percent for Obama/Biden to 2 percent for 
McCain/Palin.  In Alabama, white women voted 88 percent for McCain/Palin to 10 percent for 
Obama/Biden, while Black women voted 96 percent for Obama/Biden to 4 percent for 
McCain/Palin. 
Additionally, Obama was able to win over 40 percent of the total white vote nationwide.  
In Virginia, and North Carolina, he was able to win 39 percent and 35 percent respectively.  
However in the Deep South states of South Carolina, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and 
Arkansas, he was able to garner on average only 10 percent of the white vote. 
As is clear from the numbers change won’t come easily in the South.  Obama did not do 
as well among white Southern voters as previous Democratic candidates have done since 1976, 
excluding Dukakis in 1988.  A sober assessment of those numbers might lead one to conclude 
that there was no defeat of the Southern Strategy but only a breakthrough in three Southern states 
undergoing rapid demographic change.  The truth is somewhere in between. 
Obama’s nationwide performance among all voters tends to mask the electoral racism 
that manifested itself on election day.  The sad fact is that even among young whites, a group 
that Obama won handily nationwide 60 percent to 39 percent, in the Deep South an 
overwhelming majority cast their votes for 73 year-old John McCain. 
         Young White Southerners and the 2008 Elections 
Georgia Obama McCain 
White 18 – 29  20% 70% 
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White 30 – 44  32% 67% 
Alabama Obama McCain 
White 18 – 29  13% 84% 
White 30 – 44  10% 86% 
Virginia Obama McCain 
White 18 – 29  42% 56% 
White 30 – 44  38% 60% 
                     Source: CNN 2008 General Election Exit Polls 
 
A New Electoral Map 
Despite Obama’s poor showing among whites in the Deep South, the 2008 elections laid 
a foundation for the future.  The South is the fastest growing region in the country, even 
outpacing the Southwest.  Globalization and deindustrialization in the Northwest and Midwest 
have led to a major population shift in the country.  In fact, for Blacks one of the greatest reverse 
migrations has been under way for some time.  Latino growth in the South is second only to the 
Southwest.  In some Southern states the growth of the Latino population has had specific 
political impact.  In Florida, for example, the Cuban population has been until recently, a reliably 
Republican bloc.  The diversification of the Latino bloc to include Puerto Ricans and Central and 
South Americans has created new openings for Democratic candidates. 
Reapportionment and statewide redistricting will be based upon the upcoming 2010 
census.  Most projections show New York, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Ohio and New Jersey losing electoral votes, all of which have been either reliably Democratic 
states or states in which the party could strongly contend.   
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Five Southern states are projected to gain congressional seats and electoral votes: Texas, 
Florida, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.  These shifts impact the electoral map that 
helped put Barack Obama in office. 
In the past, the most important electoral states for the Democrats have been concentrated 
in the Midwest and Northeast, which was the rationale for the 18-state Electoral College strategy.  
However, given the rapid demographic changes, the new electoral map will include states in 
every region.  Perhaps the new battleground states will be composed of Pennsylvania, Ohio, 
Georgia, Texas, Florida, Missouri, Virginia, North Carolina, Nevada, New Mexico, Colorado 
and Minnesota.   
 
Looking Forward 
Obama’s campaign clearly understood that it made little sense to once again hand the 
Republicans a 161 electoral vote lead and then try to beat them to the 270 needed to win the 
presidency.  Obama was able to redefine the national strategy of the Democratic Party, perhaps 
for generations.  Democrats can never again consider whistling past Dixie.  The Republican 
Party’s Southern Strategy was only able to work effectively with the Democratic Party’s 
acquiescence.  There is a new political arithmetic associated with Southern presidential 
campaigning, in spite of the poor showing among white voters in several Deep South states.  The 
electoral model presented by Obama is a winning model not only for candidates of color at the 
national, state and local levels but also for liberal and progressive candidates generally. 
The “New South” will be in play in the 2012 elections.  Given today’s realities, it would 
make sense for a progressive strategy in the South to include the following key elements: 
1. Implementation of voter registration and mobilization initiatives 
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2. Development and advocacy of empowerment strategies around the redistricting debate 
3. Identification of key U.S. senatorial races that a mobilized vote can impact 
4. A combination of advocacy and electoral coalition-building on community concerns 
5. Development and implementation of a comprehensive election observation program 
Without implementation of a focused progressive strategy, the political gains won by the Obama 
will evaporate, the old Southern Strategy will reemerge and the national win will not translate 
into a thoroughgoing reformation of the politics of the region. 
 On May 17, 1957, the Rev. Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. declared, “Give us the ballot and 
we will transform the South.”  Fifty years later, Obama and Southern voters used the ballot to 
challenge the politics of the Old South, making an historic contribution to American political 
development.  This is change we can believe in and continue to build upon. 
 
